Social Imaginary in Social Change

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This paper is a contribution to the discourse on sociological imagination. The history of imagination reveals that the concept has shifted its focus from a mere reproductive or imitative ability which forms images from a preexisting phenomena to a productive or creative power which produces or constructs its own image of reality. The shift underscores the role of the actor or agent in its engagement with and transformation of the world. Thus, the metaphor of the mirror in imagination has been shattered and replaced with a prism that refracts or diffracts different images. We attribute this creative power to human imagination in society capable of creating surprising possibilities beyond expectation.

Keywords: imaginary, imagination, social change, C. Wright Mills, Jean-Paul Sartre, Cornelius Castoriadis

SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION IN THE CLASSROOM

The sociologist C. Wright Mills has coined the phrase 'sociological imagination' which has entered into the vocabulary of social theory. In the 50th anniversary of C. Wright Mills' sociological imagination, Stephen Canlas and Liz Grauerholz share their experience in teaching sociological imagination to their students in the classroom:

> ...the classroom is about empowering students to become critical thinkers and to free their minds of distractions that deprive them of considering the full range of perspectives on life's challenges, exhibiting an aggressively and openly activist sociology.[1]

These scholars underscore that the classroom is made into a space for empowering the students through the use and formation of sociological imagination by developing their critical minds and exposing them to different perspectives so that they can form a critical and activist sociology. Thus, in this imagination, reflection and engagement go hand in hand.

Although sociological imagination has become a catchword in sociology, it remains unclearly defined. Steven Danadaneau acknowledges the enigmatic character of Mills' sociological imagination and admits the difficulty in its clarification. Mill merely argues that sociological imagination refers to enlightened self-consciousness.

> In the end, the sociological imagination is the name Mills gave to enlightened self-consciousness of humanity's self-formative potential, which is not so simple to explicate or, even less so, to enact.[2]

Two points are worth mentioning and highlighting in this paragraph. First, that social imagination belongs to self-consciousness of humanity; and second, that this social consciousness is difficult to explicate and enact. It is the purpose of this paper to explain the nature of this imagination as it evolves in social theory by singling out the contribution of Cornelius Castoriadis.

IMAGINATION IN THE DISCIPLINES

In order to explicate and even enact sociological imagination, we need to review the ideas of other scholars who have also elucidated the notion of imagination. Although Sartre and Mills never refer to each other's works, we can spot some parallels in conceiving and explicating imagination as self-consciousness if we compare their well-known works, namely, Jean-Paul Sartre's *The Psychology of Imagination* published in 1948 and C. Wright Mills' *The Sociological Imagination* published in 1959. For chronological reason, let us start with Sartre's concept of imagination. According to Sartre,

> For a consciousness to be able to imagine, it must be able to escape from the world by its very nature, it must be able by its own efforts to withdraw from the world. In a word, it must be free. Thus the thesis of unreality has yielded us the possibility of negation as its condition. Now the latter is possible only by the 'negation' of the world as a whole and this negation has revealed itself to us as being the reverse of the very freedom of consciousness.[3]

In this quotation, Sartre argues, among other things, that, as a requisite of imagination, consciousness must escape or withdraw from the world. In short,

it must be free itself from the confines of the world. Such freedom allows consciousness to distance itself from the world so that it can create a space to imagine beyond the world as we have it. Thus, freedom is a precondition of imagination to function. To put it in another way, consciousness cannot engage into imagination if it is tied or fixed to the world. Consciousness and the world must be severed if we want imagination to function creatively. The gap created by this severance is the space left for imagination. The disconnection of consciousness from the world permits itself to make a twofold action: consciousness can posit and, at the same time, can negate the world. Consciousness posits the world because it is a consciousness of something. This consciousness affirms the world. However, consciousness also negates the world because it is not identified with or limited by this world. This negation highlights the contribution of imagination in the creation and change of the world. This dual action enables consciousness to hypothesize unreality or nothingness or non-existence of the world. Thus, to affirm and to negate coexist in imagination.

If Sartre views imagination from a psychological perspective, Mills considers imagination from a sociological viewpoint by applying it to the scholars theorizing on society. Mills uses social imagination in a twofold way, namely, by connecting or relating biography with history and by shifting and ranging to various spheres of human endeavors from impersonal facts to personal concerns. The craft of the sociologist is gauged in her/his ability to relate or connect these two seemingly separate realms or spheres – the personal and impersonal, proximate and remote, biography and history. Thus, the sociological imagination refers to the quality of mind of the sociologists.

> What they need and what they feel they need is a quality of mind that will help them to use information and to develop reason in order to achieve lucid summation of what is going on in the world. And of what may be happening within themselves.[4]

Thus, the sociologists should not only gather data from the field but should also reflect on them in order to connect this information into a coherent whole and intelligible manner. Moreover, they should also relate the world into their own lives. In this case, the sociologists are not detached from the world but rather they are connected with the world because they connect them in their analysis or interpretation. Mills agrees with Sartre, if not allude to him, when he locates this sociological imagination to self-consciousness.

> In large part, contemporary man's self-conscious view of himself as, at least an outsider, if not a permanent stranger, rests upon an absorbed

realization of social relativity and of the transformative power of history. The sociological imagination is the most fruitful of this self-consciousness.[5]

Both Sartre and Mills converge on the idea that imagination is an activity of human consciousness whereby the sociologists relate themselves to the world not as mere detached spectators or observers but as engaged or involved researchers in the field. The freedom or exteriority of consciousness from the world is a requisite of imagination so that it can relate itself to the world. This is similar to Sartre's idea of denial or negation of the (real) world so that the self can imagine other (ideal) world.

Based on their discussions, Sartre's psychological imagination relates with Mills' sociological imagination. If Sartre elaborated the nature of imagination by detaching or withdrawing imagination from the fixation or determination of the world, Mills applied imagination in sociology by dialectically relating biography with history. Sartre argues that freedom is the precondition of imagination which enables Mills to interplay biography and history. Thus, freedom is a constitutive characteristic of consciousness in order to imagine possible world.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ASSUMPTION

Mill as we have pointed out refers imagination to self-consciousness. We can trace this relationship of imagination and consciousness to the philosophy of phenomenology. Phenomenology is the study of phenomenon which related the world with the actor. There exists an interaction between phenomenon and consciousness. The actor forms intentionality in the consciousness. In Mill's phraseology, he refers to the interplay between biography and history. As Lyotard points out in Phenomenology:

> The term signifies a study of phenomena that is to say, of that which appears to consciousness, that which is given. It seeks to explore the given—the thing itself which one perceives, of which one thinks and speaks—without constructing hypothesis concerning whether the relationship which binds this phenomena to the being of which it is phenomena, or the relationship which unites it with the I for which it is phenomena.[6]

Thus, consciousness is consciousness of something. Consciousness cannot be empty, it must contain something. This something impinges on consciousness as intentionality of the actor or perceiver. Phenomenology is associated with intentionality of the subject that provides meaning to the

object perceived.[7] Thus, we can derive meaning of something from the intention of the perceiver.

> The term most associated with phenomenology is intentionality. The core doctrine in phenomenology is the teaching that every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have, is intentional; it is essentially consciousness of or an experience of something or other. All our consciousness is directed toward objects.[8]

For Husserlian phenomenology, consciousness is always intentional, that is, it is a consciousness of something. This intentionality tells us about this something as the characteristic property of this phenomenon directed on the perceived object. It is in this sense and usage that the term intentionality is primarily employed in contemporary philosophy.

RADICAL IMAGINATION

Cornelius Castoriadis is a well-known political activist and progressive philosopher who has developed a radical philosophy that eventually criticizes the prevailing Trotkyist Marxism within the communist movement. Unable to withstand the internal divergence that exists in the movement, Castoriadis eventually broke away from it and formed his own group which propagated its radical criticisms and analyses of society. Castoriadis has inspired the historic outbreak of the May 1968 revolution in Paris, France. Cornelius Castoriadis has contributed to the advancement of imagination by turning to psychoanalysis in understanding imagination. He stresses the place of agency as the capacity of the actor to imagine new social realities using imagination in society, which he calls the social imaginary. He has capitalized the social imaginary of society in his social theory. In his perspective, the imagination or, as he prefers to say, the imaginary is the driving force for that revolution. Imagination is defined as the faculty, that is, the capacity or power to create significations and representations. When the qualification 'radical' is added to imagination, it means that imagination is essentially creative, that is, it creates *ex nihilo* or from nothing (not in nothing or with nothing). This creativity produces infinite worlds for humanity.[9]

Social Imaginary

From the outset, Castoriadis distinguishes human beings from non-human species. For him, human beings are different because they possess the creative power called the social imaginary capable of creating new worlds. This social imaginary is inherently creative and innovative exercised by human beings.

Taking his clue from the Aristotelian notion of imagination, Castoriadis locates imagination neither in the senses nor in the intellect. Imagination lies in between the senses and the intellect. This location frees imagination from the determination or fixation of perception and intellection. The imaginary is the interminably and essentially undermined creation of society. It is society's creative power that can transform the world. The imaginary exceeds that of the world as we have it because it is open to infinite possibilities. It is irreducible to any reality or language. In an essay, Castoriadis defined the social imaginary in the following way:

> I call imaginary those significations because they do not correspond to 'rational' or 'real' elements and they are not sufficiently dealt with to reference to them, but they come into being by creation, and I call them social since they only exist as instituted and as an object of participation of an impersonal and anonymous collective identity.[10]

The imaginary cannot be referred to and delineated by the rational or the real because it is undetermined and undefined. The imaginary refers to significations composed of a reservoir of social meanings created by society. Society is a social body participated by a collectivity and motivated by the imaginary. The imaginary is instituted because it is brought about by human creation where the old world order is replaced by the new world order. Moreover, the imaginary is also instituting because of the social imaginary that emits significations which recreates society. The institution of society is effected by the social imaginary by means of new significations. This signification produced by the imaginary paves the way for the creation of a new society. A society creates its own signification by relying on this social imaginary.

Social imaginary significations create a proper world for the society considered—in fact—they are this world and they shape the psyche of individuals. They create thus a representation of the world, including the society itself and its place in this world.[11]

In this sense, imagination and signification are intertwined. A society creates the world by relying on its shared signification and by representing in symbolic form. Signification is embodied and concretized in representation. The social imaginary is therefore both signification and institution. In a way, signification is reduced to representation because the latter cannot completely capture or articulate the former. Language is the par excellence medium in which signification is represented. As a human institution, language has what Castoriadis calls its ensemblistic-identitary dimension, a term synonym with

the structuralist code, which tends toward limit or closure. The code cannot capture the open, inventive and creative imaginary signification. Signification is essentially generative, excessive and productive. There is always a surplus or excess of meaning that would rupture the prevailing social code which can usher in a new social order.

> Humanity self-creates itself as society and history – there is, in humanity's self creation, creation of the form of society, society being irreducible to any 'elements' whatsoever…This creation takes place once and for all—the human animal socializes itself—and also in an ongoing way; there is an indefinite plurality of human societies, each with its institutions and its significations, therefore each also with its proper world.[12]

Castoriadis proposes an ontology of creation. A social world is created *ex nihilo* or from nothing—a burst of imaginative power—carried out by society. It is society that constitutes itself as a collectivity in founding or instituting a society. The social imaginary is a world-forming and meaning-bestowing creative force. The institution of a society begins with chaos or multiplicity which become the axiomatic staring point in a new ontology of creation. Humanity emerges from the chaos. Once society is established, representations and significations emerge. These representations are derived from significations because they signify something or they make sense to the collective. These significations are irreducible and undermined. Since the world emerges from nothing or chaos, human beings can create and recreate the world by their own making and doing through the social imaginary. Through social imaginary, human beings form the world in the present, which they can also eventually transform in the future. Thus, the social world is contingent because it can be altered.[13] This ontology asserts that society is a self-creating and self-instituting activity of society.

> It is through the collective agency of the social imaginary that a society is created, given coherence and identity, and also subjected to auto-alternation, both mundane and radical, within historical time. Each society is created differently, subsists differently and transforms itself differently.[14]

The social imaginary is inextricably linked with institution. In fact, society is the work of the instituting imaginary. To put it in another way, the creation of the world is the construction of the social imaginary, which instaurates a social world proper to that society.[15]

The social imaginary is capable of an infinite possibilities of society but this imaginary signification fashions this particular society. Moreover, individual members are made by the instituted society, at the same time as they make it and remake it. Thus, there is a mutual interplay between them. The creation of instituting society, as instituted society, is a common world shaped in a particular type or way. The imaginary is a structuring or organizing principle of the institution created in historical time. Thus the imaginary does not operate in a vacuum but is located in particular history. Each society creates its own world depending upon historical exigencies. According to Castoriadis

> This element—which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which overdetermines the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is the creation of each historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting its own existence, its world, and its relations with this world, this originary structuring component, this central signifying-signified, the source of that which presents itself in every instance as an indisputable and undisputed meaning, the basis for articulating what does matter and what does not, the origin of the surplus of being of the objects of practical, affective, and intellectual investment, whether individual or collective—is nothing other than the *imaginary* of the society or of the period considered.[16]

Castoriadis describes the institution as an originary creation of the social imaginary in the historical field. The social imaginary creates institutions. The social agent exists in and through society which is composed of institutions. He defines the institution as a socially sanctioned symbolic network in which a functional and the imaginary components are combined and arranged in different proportions and relations. By instituting itself, society inaugurates a new ontological form that could not be derived from the preexisting social order. This society is an offshoot of a rupture or break from the present world order in history. "For what is given in and through history," says Castoriadis "is not the determined sequence of the determined but the emergence of radical otherness, immanent creation, non-trivial novelty."[17] The self-institution of society is its responsibility.[18]

This imagination is filled with a molten rock known as magma which, when it explodes, provides an indefinite number of possibilities for society.[19] The imaginary is replete with magma bursting forth with untamed energy which flows the revolutionary potentiality of creation. The imaginary is composed of magma as a structuring matrix of meaning, which organizes the world. The existence of magma is a conditio sine qua non for the institution

of society because it provides on a certain profusion of creativity in multiple forms and ways and it actualizes these virtual possibilities or singularities into concrete realities or worlds. Thus, the chaos is transformed into an order through the imaginary. Without this imaginary, chaos will forever reign. Through the imaginary, society becomes self-instituted and self-altering.

PROJECT OF AUTONOMY

Castoriadis is known for his contribution in the theory of autonomy where he offers a psychoanalytic paradigm in understanding it. The word 'autonomy' means the condition whereby people or group is capable of self-determination or self-governance according to their social imaginary. Castoriadis distinguishes between two types of social formations: heteronymous and autonomous. He opposes autonomy with heteronomy since former emanates internally from the people themselves without relying on the external factors that would effectively operate society. In heteronomy, society hinges on external sources imposing themselves on people who merely depend on these transcendental masters. In autonomy, society creates itself, not produced by the outside. Autonomous society is instituted and transformed by social actors. For Castoriadis, society is essentially autonomous because it self-legislates its own laws. A society is autonomous when it is fully aware that there is no exogenous source for its institutions and laws but it is a self-creation or self-institution. Autonomous society is self-instituting. There is neither external nor beyond society. The laws are legislated by people themselves and, through the social imaginary, alter them. Thus, autonomy cannot be comprehended apart from the affirmation of the social imaginary because it is the matrix of innovation and novelty. The social imaginary is instituted not by a heteronymous agent but an autonomous collective that provides meaning to its social world.[20] Society must be perpetually self-instituting by recognizing itself as the source and origin of its own existence. Thus, society can undo what it has made.

The social imaginary is a creation *ex nihilo* or from nothing. There is neither foundation nor destination, origin nor end. The groundlessness of this imaginary allows itself to be susceptible to limitless possibilities.

> The question of origin, foundation, cause and end are posed in and through society, but society, like signification has no origin, foundation, cause or end other than itself. It is its own origin – that is what self-creation means; if it does not have its genuine, essential origin in something that would be external to it, and it has no end other than its

own existence as society positing these ends – which is merely a formal and ultimately an abusive imaginary of the term end.[21]

People as collective agents recognize the contingency and invention of their world and the construction of that world. Since the laws are made by themselves, they own them and alter them. They habitually call into question their own institutions as representations and the social imaginary that underwrites them. This continuing questioning would loosen the grip of these institutions which would eventually lead to their collapse that can pave the creation of a new one. However, the problem is that this self-institution is generally unknown. Thus, society is self-alienated as manifested in the social representation ascribed to an exterior origin.[22] In this case, heteronymous society is self-alienated because it does not question itself but it blindly obeys its laws. In autonomy, explicit and unlimited interrogation plays a critical role. Questions become more valued than their answers through the use of language.[23] The potential of language is boundless. Thus, it is not language that limits the creativity of human beings, but rather the answers given.[24] Autonomous society questions the representation and signification. Autonomy requires a collective capacity to question the institutional order and the social imaginary that funds it.[25] Since it is questionable, the social imaginary is not a permanent world but it is a momentary construction. Society can question its own institutions by means of the social imaginary that can provide alternative world. This new relation between signification from the social imaginary to the institutional representation ushers in the birth of a new type or form of society. This emergence is a moment of creation.

Castoriadis reject the idea of distinguishing or separating individual autonomy from social autonomy since, in practice, they implicate one another. Social autonomy implies and, at the same time, presupposes individual autonomy.[26] Individuals are socialized in society where they take part in the creation and transformation of society. This popular participation entails direct engagement where people involve themselves in the legislation and implementation of laws. Furthermore, individual autonomy is only possible when members exercise their autonomy in the context of society. Thus, autonomy means the practice of democracy defined as direct and equal participation in the exercise of power. In this sense, Castoriadis favors direct democracy, and not representative democracy, which resists any form of determinism and allows moments of rupture through self-reflexive interrogation. The agent can transcend the limits imposed by the determination of structure by sourcing the creative power form the social imaginary.

Revolutionary action is spurred by the imaginary because it is moved by a common aspiration of popular democracy in the transformation of society.

For Castoriadis, it is impossible to explain the essence of social institutions if one merely relies on the psyche. The psyche must be situated or located in society because it is essentially socialized. The seat of this imaginary is found in the psyche embodied in the collective society. No society could ever be created by nomadic individuals or by solitary psyches. He states this clearly on many occasions that society is inconceivable as the product of an individual.[27] Moreover, it is also impossible to explain the psyche based merely on social institutions. The psyche is irreducible to the individual and to social institutions. The social imaginary supplies the psyche with alternative images that can question and transform society. Thus, Castoriadis' imaginary is equipped with the faculty of resistance and opposition which defy determination and fixation. Every society in history is made up of a complex and volatile amalgamation of several forces combined to form a configuration of signification that constitutes a new society. History is the site where meaning emerges and evolves. Society constitutes itself into an order and this order is sedimented.[28]

Moreover, autonomy is related to reflection that can elucidate the artificiality of society. In order to transform itself, society must become self-reflective Although autonomy is never completely realized, it must become an impulse in the project of formation in history. This autonomy is partly and slowly realized in a democratic society whereby people chart their own history by making their own laws. Democratic society is characterized by self-reflection whereby it institutes itself explicitly and knowingly by recognizing its own laws and values.[29] Reflection provides the exercise for autonomy because it makes society conscious and the law explicit. Made conscious of itself, society interrogates the prevailing order and renews itself. Autonomy signifies the limitless self-interrogation on the laws that it has created. Autonomy is not the work of a pre-given rationality, but a reflective activity of society in questioning its foundation and that interrogation initiates the creation of a new society. For Castoriadis, autonomy means that society posits its own as its self-creation. Autonomy leads to deeper self-consciousness that ushers in a new order. In this sense, autonomy is the ability to question the social order that it has made and maintained. Once it is questioned, society is explicitly objectified. A rupture is created once society becomes self-conscious about the origin and foundation of its social institutions and laws. Society is steered by the social imaginary to create a new one. The imaginary

is driven by an interrogative impulse putting into question its institutions. Nevertheless, even though humans can never step outside of their signification system, it allows them in principle to question everything.

Society creates laws and, at the same time, recognizes itself in these laws. Thus, there operates a dual action of creation and recognition that promotes self-consciousness and social transformation because society recognizes itself as the creator of this order.[30] In order to perceive itself and work upon itself, a society has to produce a representation of itself and create a distance to itself. This is paradoxical. Society produces a mirror to look at itself and sees itself as its own creation.[31] Thus, society does not only make laws but it also recognizes itself as their source. This means that we are not just talking about self-institutions, but also about explicit self-institution of society. In other words, the social order is a product of self-reflection on the institutions and laws.[32] Individuals attempt to reflect their thought and monitor their action. We break from the old order so that we can create a new form. Thus, society moves from being instituted to the instituting, or from the structured to structuring. We need no outsider to make the world for us but we only need freedom to imagine a different world order. If the world is only a social construction, then it can be altered.

CONCLUSION

As we survey the development of sociological imagination and focus on the Castoriadisian social imaginary, we notice the human desire for social change. The social imaginary is a potent force in effecting social change in society. Society proceeds to an autonomous status whereby people can interrogate their own construction and create new social world. The social imaginary is magmatic force that can explode and create a new social order. The social imaginary cannot be contained or foreclosed in society. Society yearns for a better society where their desires are recognized and satisfied. Human desire hinges on the social imaginary. Left unsatisfied, social imaginary remains a revolutionary spirit that recreates the world. Autonomy establishes a different relationship between the human psyche and the unconscious desire. Reflection enables society to ruminate explicitly on human desire.

NOTES

1   Stephen J. Canlan, & Liz Grauerholz, "50 Years of C. Wright Mills and the Sociological Imagination" in *Teaching Sociology* vol. 37, 2009, 2.

2   Steven P. Dandaneau, "Sisyphus had it Easy: Reflections of Two Decades of Teaching the Sociological Imagination." *Teaching Sociology*, vol. 37, 2009, 14.

3   Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Psychology of Imagination.* (New Jersey: Citadel Press, 1948), 267.

4   C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination.* (New York: Penguin Books, 1959), 11.

5   C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, 14.

6   Jean-Francois Lyotard, *Phenomenology*, Gayle L. Ormiston, trans. (New York: State University of New York, 1991), 32-33.

7   The concept of intentionality is derived from the philosophy of Franz Brentano. In his book, *Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint*, he says:

    "Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not do so in the same way. In presentation, something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on."

    "This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves." Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (London: Routledge, 1874), 88-89.

8   Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 8.

9   Cornelius Castoriadis, "Radical Imagination," in *Rethinking Imagination: Culture and Creativity*, eds. Gillian Robinson & John Rundell (New York & London: Routledge 1994), 139 & 184.

10 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, trans. Kathleen Blamey (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 68.

11 Cornelius Castoriadis, "Radical Imagination," 152.

12 Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the Imagination* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), 339

13 Cornelius Castoriadis, "Castoriadis and Autopoiesis," in *Thesis Eleven*, Vol. 11 (2007), 88.

14 Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, *Toward New Imaginaries: An Introduction in Public Culture*, vol. 14, no. 1, 7.

15 Castoriadis reinterprets the Aristotelian phusis as an origin and principle of movement. What animates phusis is the Eros of this form. He says:

    What remains for us is a phusis that is Eros: movement toward pushing toward from, toward the thinkable, toward law, toward eidos, Phusis appears, then, as the pushing-toward-giving-itself-a-form, a push, moreover, that can never completely be accomplished, for, as Aristotle says, there is no phusis without matter and matter is the limit of the thinkable; it is the indeterminate, the, the formless the chaotic. Cornelius, Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 333.

16 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 145.

17 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 184.

18 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 132.

19 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 343.

20 For Castoriadis, autonomy is centrally linked to the Greek philosophical invention of nomos that gives meaning to autonomy. Society creates this order or law. Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 332.

21 Cornelius Castoriadis, World in Fragments, 315.

22 Cornelius Castoriadis, The Imaginary Institution of Society, 327.

23 Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, and Autonomy: Essays in Political Philosophy ed. David Amens Curtis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 163.

24 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 126.

25 Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 314.

26 Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 340.

27 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 247.

28 Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of Society*, 1987.

29 Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 340.

30 Cornelius Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics and Autonomy*, 164.

31 Cornelius Castoriadis, *World in Fragments*, 340.

32 Cornelius Castoriadis, *Philosophy, Politics and Autonomy*, 164.

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